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Consciousness and the Mind of God, by Charles Taliaferro, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
ROGER FLORKA, Ursinus College 
The contemporary intellectual predominance of materialism grows out 
of an accumulation of arguments that gain power by uniting various scien-
tific disciplines. Charles Taliaferro hopes to counter the unified power of 
the materialist theory with a cosmological picture that has a unity of its 
own, bringing together dualism about persons and a form of classical the-
ism. The thought is that each gains by supporting the other. The first two-
thirds of Consciousness and the Mind of God is given over to evaluating the 
leading philosophical arguments for various forms of materialism and 
putting forward a case for Taliaferro's preferred brand of personal dual-
ism, which he calls "integrative dualism" to distinguish it from the views 
associated with Plato and Descartes that grant too much independence to 
the mental. The final one-third of the book piggy-backs on the earlier dis-
cussion and is devoted to the presentation of Taliaferro's "integrative the-
ism" and criticisms of various Neo-theistic views that have attempted to 
placate materialist sentiments in various ways. 
This book includes an insightful critical review of the main materialist 
positions in anglophone philosophy of mind-and many that are less 
prominent-and an introduction to some Neo-theistic views that will seem 
strange to traditional ears. The brightest stars in contemporary material-
ism-Paul Churchland, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, David Lewis, 
Thomas Nagel, John Searle, Sydney Shoemaker-strut across the stage of 
the book and are all given a honest chance to present some of their most 
subtle and attractive arguments. This is where Taliaferro's book is most 
valuable, as a survey and evaluation of the strongest materialist positions. 
At every point Taliaferro has thoughtful observations and explanations. 
Moreover, the final chapters sympathetically present the revisionist theolo-
gies of Adrian Thatcher, Fergus Kerr, Grace Jantzen and others. The 
author's arguments for his own integrative dualism and integrative theism 
are a useful addition to this vast field, if only by illuminating the surround-
ing theories in the process of self-clarification. 
The first chapter presents some prominent materialist arguments, puts 
forward a criterion for the non-identity of mental and physical properties (a 
so-called dual-aspect theory) and then chips away at the plausibility of the 
materialist case generally. Chapter Two introduces Taliaferro's own integra-
tive dualism, the view that we persons are nonphysical yet in an integrative 
union with our material bodies, and describes its advantages over other 
forms of dualism, especially with respect to materialist objections about the 
possibility of a coherent theory of meaning and about vulnerability to other-
minds skepticism. The next chapter presents a modal argument for types of 
dualism that are more substantial than those that distinguish only between 
mental and physical properties. The final three chapters are more theologi-
cally focussed. Chapter Four argues that integrative dualism avoids the 
world-denying, body-hating aspects of Platonic and Cartesian dualisms 
that have led to a Neo-theistic embrace of materialism. Chapter Five devel-
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ops Taliaferro's integrative theism by an explanation of God's omnipres-
ence in the universe, as evinced in divine agency and knowledge. The final 
chapter details the arguments for passibilism, God's intimate emotional 
presence in and interaction with the world. 
Taliaferro's arguments for dualism, both weaker and stronger versions, 
rely on the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (if A is B, then 
whatever is true of one is true of the other). You are justified in believing 
that the two cars you saw on different occasions are not the same car if you 
are justified in believing that something true of one is not true of the other 
(say, that one "was built [entirely] in Japan" while the other "was built 
[entirely] in Norway"). Of course, your belief could be wrong, but the prin-
ciple does justify the inference, given the right kind of evidence. 
Initially, Taliaferro argues for a weak version of dualism, which is 
meant to soften us up for the more substantial dualism to come. He makes 
three emendations to the simple principle of indiscemibility of identicals, 
only the first two of which he comments on. The emended criterion of non-
identity is: "for any property X and any property Y, if I have reason to 
believe that I can conceive of X without conceiving of Y, I have reason to 
believe that X and Yare not identical" (p. 52). First, he qualifies the criteri-
on in a way that recognizes the possibility of mistakes. He is a dualist who 
is satisfied to argue that he has reason to believe the mental and the physical 
are not the same, though he admits that he might turn out to be wrong. 
Second, this weaker dualism is formulated in terms of properties rather 
than objects. Later, we get the sterner, more substantially dualistic ver-
sions. Third, the criterion is not formulated in terms simply of what is true 
of the properties but in terms of whether one conceives of them. It is this 
final shift of formulation that creates problems for Taliaferro. 
Consider his instantiation of the argument for property dualism. "I can 
conceive of auditory sound experience without conceiving of the accompa-
nying sinusoidal compression wave trains, the motion of my eardrum, and 
so on" (53). So, according to the criterion, the (mental) property of being an 
auditory experience is not the same as the (physical) property of being a 
compression wave train, being the motion of my eardrum, etc. But contrast 
the earlier example of the cars. Forget the defeasibility qualification, forget 
the application to properties. What forced the inference to the non-identity 
of the cars was the incompatibility of what was said of them. Being built 
entirely in Norway and being built entirely in Japan could not be true of a 
single automobile. But that incompatibility is lacking in the case Taliaferro 
presents on behalf of property dualism. 
Consider whether Bill's favorite property and George's favorite proper-
ty are the same. Does Taliaferro's criterion help? I have reason to think the 
properties are different, his criterion tells us, if I can conceive of one with-
out conceiving of the other, and surely I can do that. After all, I might not 
even know that George exists. It is a consequence of Taliaferro's criterion 
that, if we can give different property descriptions and can think of one 
description without thinking of the other, we have reason to think they 
describe different properties. This makes Taliaferro's criterion too strong: 
when would we ever identify two different conceptions as of the same 
property? In fact, Taliaferro offers no clear example of two reputed proper-
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ties that are the same. (The closest he comes are unhelpful examples of 
high philosophical controversy-for example, being knowledge and being 
justified true belief.) Since it seems to me that I can conceive of the property 
of being the sum of 3 and 4 without thinking of the property of being the 
sum of 4 and 3, by Taliaferro's criterion those are different properties. 
Taliaferro himself recognizes that my being able to conceive of the prop-
erty of being the 42nd President without conceiving of the property of 
being Al Gore's running mate does not show that the 42nd President was 
not Al Gore's running mate. But his diagnosis of what blocks that inference 
turns on the difference between properties and bearers of properties. His 
conceptual criterion, he claims, gives us reason to differentiate among the 
former, not among the latter. The properties are surely non-identical, but to 
go on to draw a conclusion about the non-identity of the bearer(s) is a com-
mon error. "It is because I can distinguish the properties being a Roman 
orator known by many people as Tully from being someone who 
denounced Catiline and who is known by many people as Cicero that I am 
enabled to reach the mistaken view that Tully and Cicero are different peo-
ple, whereas there is only one person known by virtue of possessing these 
different properties." (57) But this diagnosis is wrong. What is behind such 
reasoning, if anyone did ever indulge in it,is the assumption that, where 
there's different names, there's different people, and if that assumption is 
unjustified, then so is the inference. But justified or not, the reasoning 
involves adding to the attribution of the properties-being named Tully 
and being named Cicero-the idea that they are incompatible, not merely 
different. (Who would think that because there's a piece of fruit in my 
drawer that is round and there's a piece of fruit in my drawer that is 
orange that I've got two pieces of fruit?!) It's not the move from concep-
tions of properties to the bearers of properties that is the problem: it's the 
assumption about the incompatibility of properties.2 
Taliaferro's integrative dualism Inakes its first full-dress appearance a 
third of the way through the book in response to a couple objections that 
have troubled more fractured forms. If mental events are utterly separated 
from the physical and bodily realm, how is it possible to have any shared, 
public communication about them, and how is it possible to know anything 
at all about the mental states of another person? Taliaferro seems to grant 
that if our minds were utterly disembodied, unintelligibility and skepticism 
would follow. His answer is to maintain the metaphysical distinctness of 
our minds and bodies while recognizing the contingently embodied nature 
of persons. Though metaphysically distinct, the person and his body are 
"profoundly united" and "interwoven," forming "a singular reality" and "a 
substantial unity." What this personal embodiment amounts to is illustrated 
by the commonplaces of daily life. It's not that my brain perceives using my 
eyes or that my body is a container in which 1 dwell. "I feel with these fin-
gers and this skin, I see with these eyes, smell with this nose ... I feel my 
heartbeat or have a stomach ache." T can move (parts of) my body directly, 
not by means of moving something else (though I can do that, too). My 
movements "incorporate" and "realize" my intentions. 1 am a certain size 
and weight. These and other platitudes make me more than a spirit inhabit-
ing a body and also more than a mere material body. 
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So, Taliaferro has charted a course between the Scylla of materialistic 
functionalism, which appreciates the crucial role of public causal relations 
for the possibility of meaningful content yet ignores the real distinction 
between the phenomenal and the behavioral, and the Charybdis of frac-
tured dualism, which appreciates the real separability of the mental and the 
physical yet pushes the former into a privacy that is incoherent and redo-
lent of skepticism. This reviewer is very much in sympathy with Taliaferro's 
project, and the platitudes about sensation, thought, and action do chart the 
right course. But what's missing is a higher order of philosophical explana-
tion of this middle ground. Saying that mind and body are metaphysically 
(if contingently) distinct yet "profoundly linked" merely whets the appetite. 
Saying that the body "embodies" the mind is no explanation of their rela-
tionship at all. At most it marks the spot where explanation is required. It is 
important to realize that the requirements on Taliaferro are dramatic and 
different from those on some of his competitors. An identity theorist, say, 
can call on analogies from the scientific canon-the identity of water and 
H20 or of genes and DNA. But Taliaferro's integration of mind and body is 
metaphysically unique, and, therefore, completing his project means recast-
ing basic categories of metaphysics itself. The commonplaces of personal 
embodiment are not the solution: they pose the question. 
At the center of the book is a modal argument for substantial dualism of 
minds and bodies. Like the earlier, weaker argument for property dualism, 
it relies on what we can conceive and on the application of the principle of 
the indiscernibility of identicals. But unlike that earlier argument this 
stronger version turns on a true incompatibility of properties, the possibili-
ty of a mind existing without a body versus the possibility of a body exist-
ing without a body. Putting aside criticisms aimed at clearly invalid forms 
of the argument, which can be avoided by requiring a direct reference to 
the things compared, Taliaferro finds the most serious threat to his argu-
ment in Nagel's distrust of modal intuitions. Why think that what see illS 
possible to us really is possible? Part of Taliaferro's response to Nagel is to 
accuse him of inconsistency since ironically the sort of conceptual thought-
experiment Nagel rejects for dualism he applies within his own argument 
against the view that there are no features of reality that are beyond human 
conceivability. But, his alleged inconsistency aside, Nagel is right to point 
out that the use of modal intuitions requires some principled justification. 
Taliaferro's answer is that the modal arguer not be "intellectually negli-
gent." To some, I suspect, this appeal to intellectual virtue will seem little 
more than hand-waving, and it is true that the author offers slim practical 
advice, acknowledging the difficulties involved in filling out concepts like 
attentiveness and carefulness. But though one might wish for more, it 
seems to me that Taliaferro is right to bring us to this place where there is 
evaluation without comprehensive explicit rules. He should be commend-
ed for not giving in to the temptation piously to pronounce speciously pre-
cise prescriptions. 
The last set of three chapters-the final third of the book-is devoted to 
applying the lessons of integrative dualism to some problems in contem-
porary theology. Once again, Taliaferro takes a stance between non-inte-
grative dualism and materialism, but here the materialistic target is not 
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atheistic. The Platonic and Cartesian dualisms that have accompanied 
much of traditional theology have unforhmate consequences that have led 
some theologians to embrace features of materialism. Fractured dualism 
can result in a fragmentizing individualism, an excessive asceticism, and a 
denial of the value of the physical world and its ecology. A backlash from 
theologians like Adrian Thatcher, Fergus Kerr, and Grace Jantzen has led 
to post-dualist theologies of human and divine nature, theologies that 
incorporate materialist lessons in various ways. Taliaferro argues that an 
integrative dualism can furnish clues for a theology that retains much of 
the classical theistic picture while avoiding both the denigration of the 
physical and the paradoxes of a materialistic theism. 
Integrative dualism, Taliaferro argues, makes more sense of a number of 
traditional Christian theological questions than either the non-integrative 
dualisms or the new materialistically-influenced theism. The Incarnation, 
the Resurrection, and the afterlife are all best understood according to a 
model that accepts the possibility of a true embodiment yet allows for the 
perfect separation of the soul and the body. Moreover, God's relation to the 
cosmos is illuminated by the idea of integrative theism that borrows aspects 
of our mvn dualistic status. While God is not embodied in the universe, His 
omnipresence there conserves its existence and explains the possibility of 
His agency and omniscience. The integrative aspect of Taliaferro's view is 
most on display in his advocacy for the personhood of God, with His pas-
sional, loving, even suffering nature. Taliaferro's passibilism dovetails nice-
ly with his integrative dualism, at least at the analogical level. But it shares 
with that view-and even augments-a sense of ultimate metaphysical 
mystery. A suffering presence that is disembodied is even more mysterious 
than metaphysically distinct things that are metaphysically united. Perhaps 
we have simply reached bedrock, and metaphysics and theology must rest 
content with describing accurately the peculiarities of these singular cases. 
Ursinus College 
NOTES 
1. I'm ignoring here issues of implicature. Why would I describe the self-
same fruit to you using semantically different--even if logically consistent-
sentences? 
2. If one were justified in thinking that the property of being the 42nd 
President is incompatible with being Gore's running mate, then one would be 
justified in thinking that the 42nd President is not Gore's running mate. 
Reason for the Hope Within, edited by Michael J. Murray. Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999. Pp xvi, 429. Cloth $22.49. 
KLAAS J. KRAA Y, University of Toronto 
In a well-known paper, Alvin Plantinga urges that "Christian philosophers 
